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Archie Cox is a teacher. He taught generations of law students at Harvard
Law School and, more recently, at Boston University School of Law. He left
the classroom on three occasions, reluctantly, when first President Truman,
then President Kennedy, then President Nixon's Attorney General called Professor Cox to Washington to play a part on the national stage. In his first
weeks as Watergate Special Prosecutor, Cox carried with him a stack of blue
books, Labor Law examinations he still had to grade (p. 263). In the public
eye, his straight-backed demeanor, his familiar crew cut, half-glasses, bow
tie, and tweeds were the very image of "The Professor." Each time a
Washington job ended-and they ended in abrupt and unexpected ways-Cox
returned to the classroom. Over a teaching career that has extended (thus far)
from the Fall Semester of 1945 to the Spring Semester of 1997, he taught the
most valuable lesson a constitutional democracy can learn: the limits of the
rule of law.
One of Cox's students, Attorney General Elliot Richardson, appointed his
old teacher to the position of Watergate Special Prosecutor. Another of
Cox's students, Ken Gormley, has now given him a fine, rich biography.
Readers interested only in the details of the Watergate debacle will be disappointed to find that the Watergate burglars do not stumble onto the scene until page 229. The vivid details of that oft-told story are enlivened with Cox's
own recollections and those of many others newly interviewed for this book.
But the book takes the whole man as its subject, bringing the same lively at*Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I thank Carol F. Lee, Clark
Byse, and Larry Yackle for their comments and suggestions, not all of which I have taken.
I should disclose that I read this book in manuscript and contributed a bit of factual mate-

rial to the final version.
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tention to Cox's earlier adventures in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations. The publishers are to be commended for allowing Gormley
to include 100 pages of endnotes and an extensive bibliography of published
and unpublished sources, fruitful fields for future analyses of Archie Cox's
career. Much of the new information comes from Gormley's interviews with
141 sources named in his bibliography.
One ostensible theme of this book lies in a framing device Gormley uses at
the book's beginning, middle, and end. It is a theme of missed opportunity.
In the extended prologue, Gormley sketches the career of Archie's greatgrandfather, William M. Evarts, who defended President Andrew Johnson in
the impeachment trial of 1868 (pp. xv-xxii). Gormley concludes that Evarts
"was a great man who never quite became great," who "never occupied a
seat on the Supreme Court" (p. xxi). In the middle of the book, Gormley reflects on Cox's own nearest approach to a Supreme Court appointment in the
early 1960's: "If fame could be visualized as a towering ladder to the stars of
one's profession, Archibald Cox could now be viewed as securely perched
on fame's second rung-largely by choice-losing his final chance to scale to
the top" (pp. 197-98). In the epilogue, Gormley repeats the theme:
"Archibald Cox had risen high in the world of name recognition and national
acclaim, but he would never quite receive the top prizes of his profession,"
remaining instead "a footnote in American history" (p. 437).
It is hard to imagine Archie Cox's life and career as less than a full success. True, he would have liked to be a Supreme Court Justice (p. 437). Almost any lawyer or law teacher would. But appointment to the Supreme
Court is not the only measure of success or greatness or fame. The compromises and politicking that it would have taken to "climb the last rung" of that
ladder were a price that Archibald Cox would have been unwilling to pay.
As a biographer said of his great-grandfather Evarts, Cox "did not seek office, but let it seek him" (p. xxii). He did not cling to public office, nor
capitalize on public fame, nor parlay one appointment into a higher one. Instead, he served his country, he defended his principles, and, when his principles required that he end his public service, Cox returned to his life-long
career as a teacher. The greatness of a teacher is achieved year by year, in
articles and books written, lessons taught, skills honed, and virtues exemplified for students in the classroom.
The better theme underlying Ken Gormley's biography is a pattern implicit in the key episodes of Archie Cox's career: in different roles and in
different ways he confronted the limits of the rule of law. For those who
connect the name of Archibald Cox with nothing more than the Saturday
Night Massacre of October 20, 1973, this biography portrays other occasions
on which Cox traded the law school classroom for a government desk to
teach larger lessons, with greater effect.
Cox's teaching career began in 1945. He had just returned from wartime
jobs in Washington to the Boston firm of Ropes & Gray. Dean James M.
Landis surprised him with an offer to teach Labor Law and Torts at Harvard
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Law School (p. 59). Cox had graduated from Harvard College in 1934 with
an indifferent record and from Harvard Law School in 1937 at the top of his
class (pp. 21-23, 30). He began as a probationary Lecturer on Law and received a tenured professorship in 1946 (pp. 61, 63). He taught Labor Law
and Torts.' In 1948, he "wrote the book," publishing Cases on Labor Law
with Foundation Press. Labor law was a relatively new classroom subject in
1945, not far removed from the violent struggles between labor and management of the previous half-century. At that time, it was not an abstract
question to inquire whether courts and agencies could compel both sides to
obey the law.
In June 1952, President Harry Truman appointed forty-year-old Professor
Cox, budding labor law scholar, to serve as chairman of a reconstituted
Wage Stabilization Board (p. 66). His job, and that of Board members from
organized labor and big business, was to impose guidelines limiting wage increases during this time of strikes in many major industries and war in Korea
(p. 63). When John L. Lewis's United Mine Workers negotiated a $1.90 per
day wage hike for coal miners, Cox's Board voted to allow a raise of $1.50
per day (pp. 69-70). The next day, 300,000 coal miners walked out, defying
the official order of the Board. Cox was conscious that his Board would have
to command respect for law. He announced:
The foundation of a free society is voluntary acceptance of the decisions
reached under the processes of democratic government. A Congress
elected by the people made wage stabilization the law of the land....
Both the miners and their leaders must know that freedom-their freedom-cannot long survive when the supremacy of law is challenged by
naked power (p. 70).
Cox insisted on enforcing the Board's decision and held firm during a sixweek standoff (pp. 71-72).
Finally, President Truman himself bowed to union pressure, approved the
full wage increase for the coal miners, and overruled the Board's order (p.
73). The next day, December 4, 1952, Cox resigned. His public letter to the
President denounced "the use of economic power to compel a change of
government policies" and called the decision to allow the wage increases
"fundamentally wrong" (p. 76). As Gormley describes it, "[tihe whole point
of his quitting was not to display anger or disrespect for the president; it was
to illuminate the matter for the public, bring it into sharp focus for debate, so
that such errors of government did not repeat themselves" (p. 75). Cox returned to teaching, and expected that his ventures into government service
were over. He was not looking for future presidential appointments. Instead,
he tried to teach a lesson that enforcement of a federal statute or administra-

I See annual entries for "Cox, Archibald" in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW
(1946-1984). These and subsequent references to
Professor Cox's courses at Harvard Law School are from this series.
SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
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tive order should not bow to union muscle or management stonewalling. To
Cox, a law that cannot compel or command obedience is no law at all.
Professor Cox remained in the classroom until 1961. He was now teaching
Administrative Law and Agency in addition to his specialty, Labor Law. He
scheduled his classes early in the week to leave days aside for labor arbitrations and Supreme Court arguments (pp. 79, 81). Beginning in 1953, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy sought Cox's advice concerning matters
before the Senate Labor Committee (p. 98), and in 1960 appointed him
chairman of an Academic Advisory Group (p. 115) responsible for drafting
speeches for Kennedy's presidential campaign (p. 129). Cox wrote to his
Harvard colleague Clark Byse, "political campaigns are so inconsistent with
all our professional training that it will be a personal satisfaction to rejoin
you all in November" (p. 136). This return to the classroom would last less
than two months.
President Kennedy appointed Professor Cox Solicitor General in his new
administration (p. 144). Cox resigned his Harvard professorship and moved
to Washington. He selected a civil rights case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 2 for his first argument and won it (pp. 149, 151). From 1961 to
1964, Cox presided over battles in the Justice Department over how to argue
the "sit-in" cases. 3 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund sought to reverse convictions of protesters arrested for trespass or breach of the peace at privately
segregated lunch counters, amusement parks, and the like. The Solicitor
General joined in amicus curiae briefs. Attorney General Robert Kennedy
and NAACP chief counsel Jack Greenberg favored a bold approach. They
urged Cox to argue that when state courts enforced ordinary trespass and
breach-of-peace laws in a way that furthered private discrimination, the
courts were engaging in "state action" prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court had adopted just such reasoning in 1948 in Shelley
v. Kraemer,4 a decision ending enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
(p. 156).
According to Gormley, Solicitor General Cox opposed this line of argument not because he thought it would fail, but because he was afraid that it
would succeed. Cox, like Robert Kennedy, wanted to end segregation and
vindicate civil rights. Cox understood, however, that the Attorney General's
approach called for the Court to reject the Civil Rights Cases5 of 1883, which
had sharply narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps a majority of
Justices on the Supreme Court in 1963 or 1964 were likely to do so. But to
2

365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that racial discrimination by a restaurant constitutes

state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment).
3 This

line of cases grappling with the interaction between private racial discrimination

and state action included Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), and Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
4 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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jettison such longstanding precedent, Cox feared, could weaken the Supreme
Court's authority. Gormley summarized Cox's concerns: "Cox worried
about the future of the American constitutional system if he pushed bad law
on the Court and they bought it, [as] it could permanently damage the notion
of stare decisis" (p. 157). Ultimately, Cox obeyed the lessons of "judicial
restraint" taught by his old teacher, Felix Frankfurter, and by his first employer, Learned Hand (pp. 35-47). Instead of inviting the Court to build
upon its Shelley v. Kraemer jurisprudence, Cox found narrower grounds to
argue for the reversal of each "sit-in" case (p. 157).
Ken Gormley gives only a few pages to this internal Department of Justice
debate, though it raises perhaps the most interesting questions-from a law
teacher's perspective-in the entire book. Other historians have described the
controversy in greater detail from different perspectives. 6 One further important circumstance was that Cox sought to avoid a Supreme Court decision
that might complicate the Administration's efforts in Congress to enact what
became
the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
7
1964.
Reduced to a classroom hypothetical, the hard question would be this: If
an advocate predicts that the court would adopt a certain novel doctrine if it
were argued, and believes as a matter of personal morality that the result in
the particular case would be just if the doctrine were adopted, should that
advocate nevertheless "protect the court from itself" and refrain from making
the argument for fear that the court, by adopting that doctrine, would lose a
measure of its legitimacy? Stated in that abstract way, the decision depends
on how much legitimacy the court would lose. But is that a decision for the
advocate to make, or for the court itself? If a majority of the court, with at
least as full an appreciation of the risks and benefits as the advocate has,
would be willing to adopt a new doctrine when it is argued before them,
should the advocate save the court from itself?
An important aspect of Cox's actual decision, left out of this hypothetical,
is the nature of the office of Solicitor General. The institutional reputation of
the Solicitor General and the personal reputation of Archibald Cox would
give the argument greater weight than it had when NAACP lawyers argued
it. It was because Solicitor General Cox would be arguing the Shelley v.
Kraemer point that it stood a chance of commanding a majority. If the argument were unsuccessful, it could decrease the reputation and hence the ef-

6

See, e.g.,

JONATHAN D. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN COURT: CIVIL

LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1957-66, at 65, 147-48 (1972); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 309-13 (1994); VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 289-95
(1971); STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN
EXPLORATION OF SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES 312-15 (1977).

7 See NAVASKY, supra note 6, at 292 (discussing Cox's concerns with advancing the
Shelley rationale).
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fectiveness of the Solicitor General in future cases before the Court. Regardless of the argument's success, however, the authority, reputation, and
effectiveness of the Supreme Court should be matters for the Supreme Court
to weigh in the balance, not for advocates before it.
With the benefit of hindsight, I regret Cox's decision, at least as Gormley
portrays that decision in the biography. The Supreme Court's reluctance to
carry out the implications of the Shelley v. Kraemer decision seems to me the
real "missed opportunity" of this episode. Yes, in so doing, the Court would
have repudiated a number of old and unfortunate precedents (as the Court
had done in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education8 ). But what new and fruitful lines of precedent would have been created? Our constitutional arrangements would have been profoundly different. Advocates and judges owe a
duty not only to their institution's past, but also to its future and that of society. 9
In the sit-in cases, the question for Cox was complicated in various ways,
more complicated than Gormley's account or my simple hypothetical reflect.
For example, as Cox later recalled in a conversation quoted in Victor
Navasky's Kennedy Justice, the margin of success or defeat for the Shelley
argument was very close indeed: "At one point the gossip was that they
stood four and one fourth to four and three fourths, since one Justice was
three fourths against expanding the state-action concept."10 When Cox as
Solicitor General thought about damage to the Supreme Court's authority, he
had in mind the same issue he confronted on Truman's Wage Stabilization
Board, the limits of the rule of law. Would the Court's order be obeyed?
Jack Greenberg recounted Cox's concern that if a private discriminator could
not call upon the police and courts to enforce ordinary trespass and breachof-peace laws (because this would be unconstitutional "state action"), then
"he might take it upon himself to throw the demonstrators out, leading to
unpredictable levels of violence.""I Burke Marshall, then head of the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division, summarized this consideration in a
memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy:

8 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
1 When he argued Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the legislative reapportionment
case, Cox decided on the opposite course, asking the Supreme Court to reject a long tradition of reluctance to intervene in state political arrangements (pp. 166-69). Cox told the
Justices: "Judicial inaction through excessive caution or a fancied impotence in the face of
admitted wrong and crying necessity, might do our governmental system, including the
judicial branch, still greater damage" than judicial activism. Gormley reports that Cox left
the argument with "an ungodly fear that 'maybe I was going to win.' . . . Was he betraying the Court, as an institution, by telling the justices that they could meddle with state
politics?" (pp. 167-68). Cox prevailed in a six-to-two decision, and the republic did not
fall. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
1oNAVASKY, supra note 6, at 292.

11GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 309.
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[T]he most that would be decided is that the police cannot be called
upon by the owner of the facility. Such a decision could, and undoubtedly would, in many places, invite the owner of the premises or mobto take it upon themselves to deal with any Negroes demanding service. 12
As Solicitor General, Cox was protecting the Supreme Court not merely
from its inclination to reject old precedents, but also from the danger that its
decisions would be disobeyed and disregarded so widely that the limits of the
rule of law would be reached. A habit of voluntary acceptance and obedience
is, in the end, the real guarantee of a court's authority. Advocates as well as
judges can feel a legitimate obligation to protect a court from issuing judgments that would weaken or destroy that habit of obedience on which the
rule of law rests. Exceptionally brave or reckless judges and advocates have
tested these limits at times, and the courts have endured. But Cox's lesson
about the limits of the rule of law is an important one.
In the midst of the sit-in cases, Archie Cox's friend President Kennedy
was assassinated, and Lyndon Johnson took office. Cox could have entrenched himself as Solicitor General until President Johnson appointed him
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Instead, on June
25, 1965, Cox resigned (p. 194) and Johnson appointed Thurgood Marshall
as his successor. The teacher returned to the classroom.
Back at Harvard Law School, Cox taught Constitutional Law, and occasionally Criminal Law, as well as his old standby, Labor Law. On May 16,
1973, while he was delivering a series of lectures at the University of California at Berkeley, Cox received a telephone call from Elliot Richardson,
who had just been appointed President Nixon's Attorney General. Richardson asked his old teacher to accept the position of Watergate special prosecutor (pp. 232-33). Cox reluctantly accepted. What he did not know, until
the writing of this book, was that seven other eminent judges and lawyers
had declined Richardson's offer of this job (p. 234). 13
Cox had not sought the appointment and was reluctant to accept it because
it meant leaving the classroom again. He worried that he was setting a bad
example for his younger faculty colleagues "to view academic life as a temporary perch upon which to hang one's hat while looking to jump to the next
government post" (p. 236). Nevertheless, he brought two young Harvard
colleagues, James Vorenberg and Philip Heymann, to help establish the office in the summer of 1973 (p. 249). Another law teacher, Professor Charles
supra note 6, at 293 (quoting a memorandum dated December 2, 1963).
The seven were Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the Second Circuit, Judge Edward
Thaxter Gignoux of the District of Maine, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Judge David W. Peck of New York, Justice William H. Erickson of
the Colorado Supreme Court, Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr. of New York, and Warren
Christopher, then a former deputy attorney general. Lawrence Walsh and Leon Jaworski
were also considered, but were not asked (p. 234).
12 NAVASKY,
13
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Alan Wright of the University of Texas, would be Archie's opponent in the
Nixon White House as special consultant on the Watergate case (p. 274).
Within a month after that first telephone call, Cox and his team were
meeting with White House lawyers and requesting a "tape recording" of
Oval Office conversations that an assistant attorney general had mentioned
(pp. 255, 275). The President refused on grounds of executive privilege. In
the District Court 14 and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 Cox won his
point that the tapes must be turned over to his office. Friday, October 19,
1973, was the last day on which the President could petition for Supreme
Court review of the order to furnish the tapes (p. 335). Cox's real fear was
that President Nixon would not petition for certiorari. "What if the president
simply did not comply with the court order? What if he challenged the law?
What if he simply said, 'I won't turn over the tapes'? All these questions, in
Cox's words, 'ate at my insides.'" (p. 315). While his lawyers debated how
a court's order could be enforced against a recalcitrant, embattled president,
Cox prepared for a last-minute compromise (pp. 315, 329). He had again
come face to face with the limits of the rule of law.
The end of this story is well known. Late that Friday night, President
Nixon ordered Special Prosecutor Cox to stop subpoenaing White House
tapes. Archibald Cox refused. The next day, in a memorable televised press
conference at the National Press Club, Cox said:
I'm not looking for a confrontation. I've worried a good deal
through my life about the problems of imposing too much strain on our
constitutional institutions, and I'm certainly not out to get the President
of the United States. I'm even worried, to put it in colloquial terms, that
I'm getting too big for my britches, that what I see as principle could be
vanity. I hope not. In the end I decided I had to try to stick by what I
thought was right (p. 351).
Later on October 20, 1973, in what became known as the Saturday Night
Massacre, President Nixon ordered Attorney General Richardson to fire
Cox. Richardson refused and resigned. Deputy Attorney General William
Ruckelshaus also refused to fire Cox and also resigned. Solicitor General
Robert Bork, third in the line of command at the Justice Department, fired
Archie Cox as Watergate Special Prosecutor (pp. 354-58). Professor Cox
returned to the classroom a national celebrity, and in the minds of many, a
national hero.
For over fifty years, Archie Cox's career has been measured out in the
steady tread of classes, examinations, and grading. It has been enlivened by
brief, intensive episodes in the public spotlight. In three of these episodes,
which form a framework and an implicit theme in Ken Gormley's biography,
Archie Cox stood at the edge of the law and saw its limits. When he stood up

14
'1

In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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to John L. Lewis's coal miners, when he decided what the Supreme Court
should be called upon to decide, and when he dared President Nixon to obey
the rule of law, Cox was not a politician angling for his next position in government; he was a teacher ready at any time to return to the classroom. His
were principled stands, not calculations of political or personal advantage.
This was the lesson he taught his students and the nation. He was and is a
role model for law students and young lawyers, and for all who would agree
with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., when he wrote that one "may live greatly
16
in the law."
Ken Gormley has written an appreciative, balanced biography. He has a
light authorial touch, for the most part letting Archie Cox speak for himself
and backing him up with details from interviews with others and from
printed sources. Gormley has not shied away from thought-provoking issues,
but rather than developing his own critique, he has laid the foundations for
future interpretation, analysis, and criticism by others.
The cooperation of the Cox family has meant that Gormley's biography
tells much more about the early years and private setting of Archie Cox's life
than even his closest teaching colleagues have guessed. Archie, as we have
known him at Boston University, is a reserved fellow; not aloof, but certainly shy, and much more ready to enter into wrangling about the legal issues of today than to reminisce about his own role in national events. This
new book has given us the whole Archie Cox, a teacher, colleague, and
friend we admire and respect all the more with this greater knowledge of
him.

16 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 30 (1920).
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